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This paper deals with a comparative analysis of the economic and social efficiency of the 
instruments used to promote renewable energy sources (RES), first from a static standpoint and then 
using dynamic criteria to assess their ability to stimulate technological progress and cost reduction. 
First, the instruments are analysed in relation to the classical discussion of environmental policy 
that opposes price-based instruments versus quantity-based instruments in an uncertain environment 
(feed-in tariffs as price based system on one hand, quotas + green certificates, competitive bidding 
as quantity-based instruments on the other hand). Next, the incentives to invest and innovate in the 
context of each framework are analysed in relation to the sharing of the surplus associated with each 
of them between producers/constructors and consumers or the public budget. Finally, the paper 
looks at the overall cost-efficiency of the policies on the basis of each instrument, by referring to 
factual evidence in European experiences. It concludes that if social preference is attached to 
climate change prevention and reflected in a high quantitative objective for renewables, sliding scale 
feed-in tariffs are a good compromise in order to promote technical progress and national RES 
industry also. The quota/certificate system also presents a number of advantages in terms of static 




The general awareness that has been growing over the past 20 years of the threats to the 
environment, in particular the risk of climate change, has led to a significant reawakening of interest 
in renewable energy, because of the environmental advantages that it represents in comparison to 
conventional energy sources. This interest led to the voting-in, on October 27 2001, of the European 
Directive on the promotion of electricity from renewable sources (hereinafter abbreviated as RES-E)
1 
with the aim of doubling the share of renewable energy in total energy consumption by 2010. Faced 
with the more specific deployment of green electricity production required by the European 
Commission (22% of gross electricity consumption by 2010 as against 13.9% in 1997), it will be a 
vital concern to achieve these goals at the lowest possible cost. 
Public funding for research and development and subsidies to encourage investment were initiated 
25 years ago and have long been the main measures used within the European Union to promote 
RES. They are still aimed at the least mature technological areas, but in the case of those that are 
nearly competitive, more specific instruments are now used with the aim of introducing RES into the 
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electricity market. Support schemes fall into three main categories that are either price-based or 
quantity-based in their approach: 
-  Feed-in tariffs, used in particular in Denmark, Germany, Spain, and France since 
2001, which were the most widely used incentive system until 2003. 
-  Bidding processes such as those used in the United Kingdom, Ireland and France until 
2000. This type of scheme is based on an overall objective for renewable energy to be 
generated nationally and reached in several successive rounds by development of 
projects framed by long-term contracts with guaranteed power purchase and price. Its 
principle allows differentiation between technologies on the basis of their differences 
of maturity. 
-  Quotas combined with tradable green certificates schemes, where electricity suppliers 
(or in some countries, producers or final consumers) are obliged to produce or buy a 
certain quota of renewable energy defined from a national objective. This type of 
scheme is already used in some countries in Europe (Italy, United Kingdom, 
Belgium), in the USA with some of the “renewables portfolio standards” (in particular 
Texas) and in Australia, but will be extended to most of the EU Member States 
(Austria, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden) in the near future. 
To help clarify matters, we propose a comparative analysis of the relative efficiency of the 
instruments used to promote renewable electricity
2, first from a static point of view and then using 
dynamic criteria. The justification of policies supporting renewable energies is made on the basis of 
both internalisation of externalities in electricity production and their role in stimulating the learning 
process in relation to still commercially immature renewable technologies. First, we characterise the 
rationale of these policies in a cost-efficiency framework; then we analyse the instruments in relation 
to the classic discussion of environmental policy that opposes price-based approaches to quantity-
based approaches; and finally, we examine the sharing of the surplus (rent) allowed by each policy 
instrument and its effects on the tendency of manufacturers and RES producers to innovate. We shall 
proceed by graphic analysis before checking the results with empirical observations. 
 
2. Rationale of public policies supporting renewable energy 
The obstacle facing renewable energies in the domestic electricity market is twofold. First of all, the 
wholesale price gives a very incomplete idea of the real cost of electricity production. As it does not 
take into account the cost of pollution control inherent in the use of fossil fuels, it prevents the 
environmental benefits of renewable energies from being considered at their true value, and thus 
removes any comparative advantage they may have. Secondly, as these technologies are not 
completely mature, they cannot enter into direct competition on the market with conventional 
technologies. Without the widespread dissemination needed for the technological learning process 
and the scale economies to occur properly, these technologies cannot aim to be competitive. Public 
intervention may therefore be justified in theory in two main ways: internalisation of environmental 
externalities and stimulation of technological change. 
2.1. A response to the limitation on internalisation of environmental externalities 
The main advantage of renewables over conventional energy is that they contribute to the 
preservation of public goods, namely clean air and climate stability. Because of the non-excludable 
and non-rival characteristics of these public goods, private actors are not prepared to invest in 
something that everyone can acquire freely. In such conditions, the diffusion of RES cannot be 
                                                 
2 The thermal use of renewable energies will not be dealt with here even though they offer a potential for development that is at least as high as that for 
electricity. Pending a European directive similar to that for electricity production, the issue of heat production from renewable energy sources is 









































assured spontaneously by the market. Deregulation of the electricity market, seen as the possibility 
offered to customers of expressing their preferences and thus their willingness to pay for this 
environmental good by the purchase of labelled green electricity, could be seen as a possible market 
solution. However, experience shows that it is a very partial response for two reasons: as can be seen 
from experience in Europe, the impacts of green programs are quite limited and the problem of free 
riding remains (Batley and al., 2001; Wiser and Pickle, 1997). Individual choices do not fully reflect 
the real value that the public may place on preserving the environment by purchasing green energy 
and therefore cannot replace public support. 
The most satisfying solution from the point of view of economic rationality would be to internalise 
environmental impacts by taxing fossil fuel prices. The level of taxes should then be calculated so as 
to compensate for the costs that the negative externalities impose on society. The appropriate level of 
taxation is however difficult to assess because of uncertainty regarding the shape of the social 
damage cost function related to fossil fuel use
3. So, as long as energy taxes (or its dual approach by 
quotas and exchanges of emissions permits) do not equalize the marginal cost of the damage caused 
by using fossil fuels, supporting RES through subsidies aims to re-establish balance in the conditions 
of competition between technologies to the benefit of the least polluting
4. 
Given the problems that occur in observing certain parameters, it is impossible to refer to an 
optimum level of renewable energy production. Consequently, one is forced to adopt a strict cost/ 
efficiency approach in which the target is defined exogenously by political decision-makers on the 
basis of available scientific information, but without strict economic rationalisation. The aims fixed 
by the European Union’s directive – however indicative – that would represent a considerable 
advance in the development of RES-E if it were respected, proceed from this cost-efficiency 
approach. It is also in this perspective that we shall compare the efficiency of the instruments 
available to the public authorities for throwing light on discussions concerning the amount of 
resources allocated to deploying renewable energies. 
1.1 2.2. Stimulating technological change 
A real appreciation of the RES advantages by the market and the establishment of equitable 
conditions for competition between fossil fuels and renewable energy sources will still not guarantee 
the creation of a dynamic renewable energy diffusion process that is consistent with the collective 
objective of preserving the environment. Renewable energy sources, which like any new technology 
have to compete with established technologies, remain in an unfavourable position. They have not 
reached their optimum performance in terms of cost and reliability. Optimum performance will be 
achieved gradually as a result of the process of learning by doing and by using (Arrow, 1962; Dosi, 
1988). In other words, as B. Arthur points out, it is not because a particular technology is efficient 
that it is adopted, but rather because it is adopted that it will become efficient (Arthur, 1989). Other 
barriers relative to the technical and economic characteristics of renewable energies stand in the way 
of their diffusion: the new actors in the liberalised electricity markets tend to favour the least capital-
intensive generation technologies with non-random energy supply. Therefore, technological and 
organisational learning processes are necessary before the RES reach their optimum performance and 
are really integrated in energy markets. 
For these reasons incentive systems are required, so that renewable energy technologies can be 
adopted beyond narrow market niches and progress on their learning curves. Public support for new 
                                                 
3 Another caveat on this rationale by environmental externalities has to be issued because of the local character of green 
electricity production, with its eventual visual impacts and their social perception. So we have to balance their 
environmental advantages with these impacts which are reflected in their perceptions by the local populations in their 
geographic context. That means also that the reference to a collective preference function is not obvious in a cost-
advantage approach given the conflictual nature of its genesis and its contingent value depending upon the specific local 
compromises.  
4 Subsidising RES production does not lead to over-consumption of electricity, which would be inefficient, as some 









































energy technologies will stimulate a dynamic process that will reveal their ultimate performance 
(Foray, 1996) and at the same time help expand the range of techniques that can contribute to 
environment preservation. 
  
3.  “Price-based” versus “quantity-based”  incentive instruments 
An examination of the policies implemented in Europe over the past 20 years to stimulate the 
development of RES shows that the instruments used all show a strong similarity to the instruments 
of environmental policy to which they can be assimilated. In particular, they raise the same questions 
from the point of view of the classical debate between price-based and quantity-based in 
environmental policies (Weitzman, 1974, Cournede and Gastaldo, 2003). 
 
3.1.The instruments for promoting green electricity development 
The different instruments are characterised by the type of subsidisation of the RES kWh, the type of 
obligation (agents to be mandated, obligation to buy or RES quotas) and the mode of financing the 
subsidy and the sharing of the surplus created by them, given that in the specific RES case, this 
surplus has mainly the nature of a differential rent. 
•  Feed-in tariffs 
The feed-in tariff scheme involves an obligation on the part of electric utilities to purchase electricity 
produced by renewable energy producers in their service area at a tariff determined by the public 
authorities and guaranteed for a specified period of time (generally about 15 years). Different tariffs 
can be defined for different technologies. As the feed-in tariff is higher than the average electricity 
price on the wholesale market, the system operates as a subsidy allocated to renewable electricity 
producers. It thus works in the same way as a subsidy does for firms that pollute. In practice, 
producers and developers are encouraged to exploit all available generating sites until the marginal 
cost of producing RES-E equals the proposed feed-in tariff p (cf. figure 1). The amount generated 
then corresponds to q. 
The overcost is generally paid by cross-subsidies if incumbents legally retain an important captive 
market that allowed cost pass-through on the tariffs, or by a special fund fed by a tax on each kWh. 
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In the simplest case of a uniform feed-in tariff, all producers in a given technology band whose 
marginal cost is lower than the fixed feed-in tariff benefit from the same tariff p. In a static approach 









































easier access, abundant resources (biomass), etc) than the marginal producer: the rent is represented 
by the area (cAp) between the marginal cost curve (Cm) and the feed-in tariff p. 
Carefully defined instruments can arbitrate between social preferences for preserving amenities by 
avoiding a concentration of installations at the most profitable sites (in particular in the case of wind 
power and small-hydropower units) and economic efficiency, which requires the most productive 
investments to be realised first. Indeed, the magnitude of differential rent will concentrate investment 
in very profitable sites where it could be disputed by social perception of the inconveniences 
associated with RES projects. Consequently it may be socially profitable to ensure a minimum 
profitability to producers at lower-quality generating sites while at the same time controlling the rent 
allowed to producers who benefit from more favourable conditions. This is possible with a tariff that 
decreases incrementally and in inverse relation to site productivity. This helps to limit the differential 
rent on the most favourable sites: the rent with a differential tariff is the area (p'BAc) situated 
between the marginal cost curve and the increments resulting from the tariff
5. 
It is the same rent limitation logic that leads to differentiation of tariffs between various technologies 
in order to avoid promoting only the ones nearest to economic competitiveness. The possibility of a 
moral hazard from the promoter should not be ignored in this situation (as in the design of energy 
efficiency policies based on voluntary agreements, for example) with the possibility of the regulator 
being captured by the developers in a context of asymmetric information. 
 
•  Competitive bidding processes 
 
In the case of competitive bidding processes, the regulating authority defines a reserved market for a 
given amount of RES-E 
1. For example, the stated objective of the NFFO in the UK was to develop 
1500 MW of new generating capacity from renewable sources by 2000 (DTI, 1995). There were also 
a quantitative objective in the French Eole 2005 to increase wind production capacity to a level 
between 250 to 500 MW by 2005. Competition between developers affects the awarding of long-
term contracts with constant prices. Selection operates mainly on the basis of the price per kWh 
proposed during the bidding process established under the rule of the pay-as-bid price auction. 
Proposals are classified in increasing order of price until the amount of capacity to be contracted is 
reached. Each renewable energy generator selected is awarded a long-term contract to supply 
electricity.  Regional electric utilities with captive markets (generally the incumbents) are then 
obliged to purchase the electricity from the selected RES producers located in their area. Bidding 
systems were used in the United Kingdom under the Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation (NFFO), in force 
from 1990 to 1998, which concerned different renewable energy technologies, and in France with the 
Eole 2005 programme set up in 1996 and abandoned in 2000, which concerned only wind energy.  
The overcost for the mandated buyers is financed by the same ways as those implementing in the 
feed-in tariffs systems, in particular a fund financed by a tax on every kWh marketed. 
                                                 










































                      Figure 2: Incentives and rents with competitive 
bidding 
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This device with pay-as-bid price has the advantage of eliminating the differential rent as producers 
are paid at their bid price (p1, p2, p3 corresponding respectively to q1, q2, q3, which is supposed to be 
very near their marginal production costs because of competition. It is also noteworthy that bidding 
procedures requires differentiation of technology bands, as in the feed-in tariff system, in order to 
avoid competition between technologies at the premature stage. 
Competitive bidding must not be considered a pure quantity-driven mechanism. The reason is that no 
quantitative objectives of renewable electricity production are set to electricity suppliers, as with the 
exchangeable quotas approach (see below). The objective here is defined on a national basis, a given 
capacity of RES to be reached in the year t; the producers are in competition with each other to be 
awarded a contract and benefit from the subsidies. We consider anyway that it belongs to the 
quantity-driven approach as, unlike the feed-in tariffs, it allows control of quantities produced (see 
below). It can be interpreted as a process of allocation of rights to receive a subsidy to produce by 
renewables under a long-term contract, these rights being interpretable as property rights on   
environmental goods. 
 
•  Quotas and green certificates 
In this type of scheme, a fixed quota of electricity sold by suppliers on the market (it could be 
another type of agent, either electricity generators or consumers) must be generated from RES
6. 
Operators then have the possibility of generating the required amount of electricity themselves, 
purchasing it under a long-term contract from a specialised renewable energy generator, or 
purchasing certificates from other operators with RES capacity beyond their quota or specialised 
entrants (Voogt et al., 2000). Certificates are issued by renewable electricity generators who benefit 
from generating renewable electricity in two different ways: by selling kWh on the electricity grid at 
the market price, and by selling certificates on the green certificates market. 
 
The amount of green electricity to be generated is decided for the whole country for different time 
horizons, as in the case of bidding schemes, but it is allocated among each of the suppliers (generally 
defined in terms of supply share). Since operators do not all benefit from the same opportunities to 
use renewable energy sources and thus have different marginal production cost curves
7, the exchange 
of green certificates enables quotas to be reached in an efficient way. In a system without such a 
                                                 
6 This obligation concerns suppliers in the United Kingdom, producers in Italy and in the near future consumers in the 
Netherlands. 
7 In the case of wind energy, for example, it is obvious that a self-producer/distributor situated near to a coastal area will 









































flexibility mechanism, (which could be seen as a “command and control” approach), operators with 
identical obligations would incur different marginal costs, which would be a source of inefficiency. 
With the exchangeable quotas, the general obligation is shared efficiently: marginal production costs 
are equalised among operators and specialised producers are encouraged to enter the market
8. It is a 
decentralised quantity approach, but the general quota qobj is reached with an equilibrium price p on 
the green certificates market that would be the same as the marginal price with the feed-in tariff and 
the bidding system in a perfect information situation. 
 














Comparatively to the feed-in tariffs, there are few differential rents in this system. Every supplier is 
obliged to respect the quotas and to pay for the overcosts of its RES production and/or purchase. The 
operators’ differential rents (here the triangle CBD for the seller of the certificates) result only from 
the advantage that some of them (the sellers of certificates) could draw from favourable local 
situations and low cost production capacity beyond their quotas. 
It is noteworthy that this quantity-based instrument could be hybridised by price-based measures. On 
one hand-side a penalty has to be paid by operators who are unable to respect their quotas of RES by 
self-production, contractual purchases or certificate purchases. The penalty constitutes in fact a price 
cap on the certificates market; it could exert a limitation on the rent of the best-endowed developers 
and on the value of their marginal projects. On the other hand-side, the amount of funds gathered by 
the payment of penalties could be used to subsidise investment in new units. 
3.2. Instruments and cost controllability 
As with environmental policies, under the dual hypothesis of perfect information on the cost of RES 
projects and zero transaction costs, price-based and quantity-based schemes produce very similar 
results. It is therefore equivalent to introduce a feed-in tariff p resulting in an overall quantity of 
production q, or to fix a quota qobj corresponding to the same quantity q, the equilibrium price (in the 
green certificates market) or marginal price (in the case of bidding processes) then becoming 
established at the level of the feed-in tariff p. The administrative authority can define the “price” in 
the case of the feed-in tariffs, or the "quantity" in the case of green certificates or competitive 
bidding, so as to reach the same green electricity production target. 
However, as in environmental policies, price-based and quantity-based approaches are not equivalent 
in situations where information is incomplete and where there is uncertainty on the shape of the cost 
                                                 
8 With the quotas, the same results could be achieved without flexibility mechanisms by assigning different objectives to 
each operator. However, in a situation where the public authority (and probably also the operators themselves) have only 
incomplete information, it is very difficult to allocate efficient quantities qA and qB that would equalise marginal costs 









































curve (and damage curve) (Cropper and Oates, 1992). There is no symmetry at all between the price-
based and quantity-based approaches, and one or the other may be preferred depending on the 
respective shape of the production cost curves (Weitzman, 1974). If it is assumed that the RES 
curves are relatively flat
9, it can be seen that a slight variation in the proposed feed-in price will have 
major repercussions in terms of quantities produced. As the overall cost of achieving an objective q 
is given by the product p.q, an overestimated fixed feed-in price will produce a significant increase in 
RES production and a large public subsidy total. In contrast, with the same assumptions, the 
quantity-based approach will help to limit this risk as fixing a quota or organising successive 
competitive bids are two ways of ensuring total control over quantities and hence indirectly over the 
volume of public subsidies. 
However, when the production cost curves are unknown or difficult to anticipate, none of these three 
approaches allows anticipation of the overall cost of green electricity production sought by the 
government. Guaranteed feed-in tariffs offer a way of controlling the cost of the measures to be 
implemented, as by setting a ceiling for the marginal cost, guaranteed prices eliminate options that 
are too costly; however, as the marginal cost curve is unknown ex ante and only anticipated, the total 
burden to the economy cannot be foreseen. Moreover, in order to balance the RES productions from 
the different technologies, bands have to be organised for each of them in order to reach the overall 
objective without favouring solely the one nearest to commercial maturity, which could increase 
uncertainties. Conversely, the quantity-based approaches (bidding, quotas) by definition offers direct 
control over target production levels but does not judge in advance of the level of the price and the 
total cost so far. 
The problem of controlling the overall cost can be partly overcome in both types of instrument. In 
the bidding device used in the UK, its drawback has been overcome by setting the global amount of 
subsidies to be allocated to the RES projects from the special fund fed by the Fossil Fuel Levy, 
which was also dedicated to supporting the nuclear units (Mitchell, 2000). In the exchangeable 
quotas system, if the price of certificates reveals that suppliers have much higher marginal costs than 
was anticipated by the government, it is perfectly at liberty to adjust the increasing quotas at a lower 
level in future. In the price-based approach, successive adjustments to the feed-in tariffs (particularly 
downwards, which is rarely acceptable politically) would have to be made to achieve the desired 
level of production. 
 
4.  Rent sharing and stimulation of technological progress 
The second justification for public RES incentive policies is that they stimulate technological 
change, as none of the RES technologies are as yet sufficiently mature to compete on the electricity 
market. Technological change will partially depend on the intrinsic characteristics of the incentive 
instruments used (their respective success in terms of dissemination) and on competition between 
developers that they may induce (§ 4.1). It will also depend on the amount and sharing of the 
resulting technological rent which is an incentive to innovate if partly or completely appropriate; but 
the amount of this rent depends also upon the instruments to be used (§ 4.2). 
4.1. Impact of the surplus profile on technological progress 
By analysing the distribution of surplus between various players, we extend the approach beyond the 
ability of the instruments to reach a given objective at a lower cost with the existing basket of 
technologies (in static efficiency criteria). In fact, we include two combined but different factors of 
dynamic efficiency and technological progress: first, the performance improvement induced by scale 
economies and technological learning associated with increasing dissemination of new technologies, 
                                                 
9 The shape of the cost curves is not precisely known but the latest studies suggest that they may be rather flat, below the 
objectives set by the European Directive for 2010 (ElGreen project, 2001, Action Plan for a Green European Electricity 









































which is called induced progress in the literature, and second, the technological progress resulting 
from dedicated R&D activities initiated by constructors and technology users seeking to reduce costs 
and gain temporary competitive advantage. These two dynamics are intrinsically combined. 
However, the relative importance of the second may vary according to the profit level that 
constructors could anticipate from their contracts with the developers, which depends on the 
instruments of the policies. Lower surplus for the developers would mean less favourable contracts 
for the constructors and weaker incentives to invest in ambitious R&D activities. 
To keep near to the reality of the renewables industry,  we have to consider two different 
players regarding innovations in renewable energy techniques: 
-  The constructors who invest in R&D programmes and introduce innovations according to 
the perspectives of market expansion and their strategy to increase market share; whatever 
the instruments, the constructors are exposed to more competitive pressure from the 
developers to introduce improved and more efficient technologies;  
-  The RES developers/producers who buy the technology from the constructors and who 
could accept to pay a mark-up in relation to the level of anticipated profits that will result 
from the sale of RES kWh produced by their new projects. They are also supposed to 
compete but the pressure is far lower with feed-in tariffs than with auctions or 
exchangeable quotas; in the second and third case, they have to compete in order to gain 
long-term contracts or sell their certificates and reduce their costs, when in the first case 
they are in a situation of a price-taker on a perfect market, which stimulates performance 
improvements, but the opportunity for rent beyond normal profitability allows a level of 
sharing of total profits with constructors. In each case, therefore, there are different 
incentives to seek cost reduction by introducing technological progress. 
For reasons of convenience, we will adopt here the same simplification as in the literature on 
oligopolistic competition based upon innovations, especially the literature on incentives to promote 
technological change in pollution control in a competitive situation (Milliman & Prince, 1989). In 
this literature constructors and producers are likened to one type of player, the motor of the 
competition being the bet on the temporary competitive advantage to be won from innovation by 
gaining a prime mover position. Here, the same simplification leads to another problem. As a result 
of this simplification, we consider first that the investment in RES production that incorporates 
technological progress is mainly incited by opportunities for technological rent appropriation, and 
second that the cost decrease may result from R&D investment on one hand and economies of scale 
or increasing returns to adoption on the other hand. In other words, in our interpretation we do not 
give the first place to the constructors’ market share strategy, which would only be a consequence of 
the rent maximisation. 
In this interpretative model, two hypotheses could be set; they have to be checked with empirical 
observations (see below). If the producer’s surplus increases with technical progress, he will be 
encouraged to innovate in order to increase its future surplus (the larger the surplus, the higher the 
incentive and ability to invest in new technologies). If the producer is subject to competitive pressure 
that prevents raising of its surplus, he will not be incited to innovate in the same way; he will have to 
cut its static costs, possibly by taking the best available technologies from the basket of existing 
technologies, but he will also have less margin of manoeuvre for investment in R&D for future 
technological progress. We have the three following profiles. 
-  With guaranteed feed-in tariffs, the maximum surplus is allocated to producers, so that 
they are better placed to develop new technologies or to incite constructors to do it, even 
though this will cost the community more. In a dynamic perspective, the system 
accumulates its good result in terms of dissemination associated with increasing returns 
on adoption, combined with the possibility to reinvest in R&D to obtain additional 










































-  The bidding system that makes producers compete with one another through competitive 
bids forces them to adopt the most efficient available technologies in order to be awarded 
contracts. Competition imposes reduction of every static cost. However, as this involves 
restricting their profit margins (by eliminating the differential rent derived from 
technological progress) despite important risk projects, initiating the innovation process 
through investment in R&D may be difficult. 
 
-  With the quotas/green certificates system the suppliers are also incited to reduce the cost 
of reaching their RES obligations and developing projects beyond their quotas to sell 
competitively green certificates. This may be important for independent developers who 
seek to have long term contracts or to sell on the certificates market. In comparison with 
the bidding system, which dissociates the technologies, the quotas system is less 
favourable to R&D investment because differentiation of technologies is not possible; this 
leads to concentration on the business nearest to maturity stage. Conversely, however, the 
quota system is assumed to force development of capacity and thus could present a good 
foreseeable nature of returns to scale for the constructor/producer. 
A last important remark has to be made on the geographic framework of this analysis, which is that 
of a closed economy. Instruments are frequently judged according to their effects at promotion in a 
national RES manufacturing industry and thus by the capability given to the nascent industry to 
innovate on the national market. However, if we reason in an open economy, the drawback that an 
instrument could present in terms of limited impacts on promotion of the national industry and  
innovation could be overcome by importing technology and equipment from the leading foreign 
industries, which have benefited from the use of another instrument much more efficient in 
promoting such an innovative industry. In this open case the cost reduction objective can be reached 
by seizing the best available technology on the international market, but also abandoning the 
objective to establish an efficient national industry to compete for the procurement of RES 
equipment on the national and international market. 
 
4.2. The technological rent: a graphical analysis of the instruments 
We also have to analyse the appropriation of the benefits resulting from technological progress. 
Extraction of technological rent is indeed a good incentive to innovate, but there is the same problem 
of equity and social acceptability as for the differential rent in the static approach. Whatever system 
of incentives is adopted, technological progress will produce a downward shift in the cost curve and 
the marginal cost of achieving a given goal will be lower following innovation. All else being equal, 
the effect will be to increase the surplus and the issue is to choose if all the benefits of the innovation 
have to be transferred to consumers or to the taxpayer. Depending upon the type of incentive used, 
the surplus created in this way will not be shared in the same manner. 
 
•  Guaranteed feed-in tariffs 
The consequence of price-based incentives is that the quantity of green electricity produced increases 
from q0* to qt*: for the same tariff level, producers can now exploit sites that were not economically 
profitable before the innovation (cf. Figure 4). This instrument gives producers the full benefit of the 
rent derived from technological progress (i.e. the area ADBC)
10. In this case, therefore, technological 
progress leads to an unscheduled increase in the quantities produced. Consequently the producers’ 
surplus increases by an amount represented by the area (CA) 
                                                 
10 The rent derived from technological progress is defined as the increase in the producer’s surplus, whereas new and 











































Figure 4: Guaranteed feed-in tariffs and rent derived from technological progress 
 
 Situation with uniform tariffs        Situation with sliding feed-in tariffs 
   
           
  
 
                       














































Key:    Cm0= marginal cost curve at 0; Cm
e
t= ex-post marginal cost curve at t. 
Cm
a
t= anticipated marginal cost curve for defining sliding tariff 
 q0*(resp. t)= optimum production at 0 (resp. t); 
 qt= production at t without sliding mechanism. 
 p0(resp. t)= optimal fixed feed-in tariff at 0 (resp. t);      p
e
t= effective feed-in tariff at t. 
 
   differential rent;                        rent from technological progress;                                         gain (cf. text), 
   surplus allocated to producers owing to wrong estimate of real technological progress.
The numerous objections concerning the magnitude of the rent left to the developers through 
constant feed-in tariffs in case of technological progress has lead to the introduction of sliding feed-
in tariffs, that is, anticipated decreasing tariffs to a specified horizon. The principle of a decreasing 
feed-in tariff involves anticipating technological progress (cf. figure 4) and hence the shift in the 
marginal cost curve. On the supposed new cost curve (Cm
e
t), the tariff needed to obtain the quantity 
q0* is no longer p0, but pt.  
However, the regulator does not know for certain how technology will develop, and he must 
therefore define a feed-in tariff p
e
t on the basis of anticipated technological curve (Cm
a
t). If the ex-
post-cost curve (Cm
e
t) differs from the administratively anticipated cost curve (Cm
a
t) because of the 
moral hazard problem, the quantity produced will be qt. A comparison of the two graphs (fig.4) 
shows that the decreasing price mechanism enables the area (p0DBp
e
t) to be saved by consumers, in 
contrast to a uniform feed-in tariff, which grants the large surplus (cDp0 ) to producers. In this way it 
is possible to limit, but not entirely eliminate, the rent derived from technological progress allocated 
to producers. Meanwhile this system ensures a more equitable distribution of the rent derived from 
technological progress; it reduces the overall cost for the community while at the same time giving 
an additional surplus to innovative producers (pt  EBp
e
t) comparatively to the situation the 
technological progress would be perfectly anticipated by the public authorities. 
 
•  Competitive bidding 
As in the static situation (see above), the procedure involving successive calls for bids means that the 
results of the competitive bidding can also follow the marginal cost curve without any intervention 
by the regulator (cf. Figure 6). The producers/developers integrate in their bids the anticipated cost 
decrease, which they hope has resulted from their innovative activities. The maximum prices p’3 and 









































to the calls on q3 – q2 and qobj –q3, thus cancelling the potential rent derived from technological 
progress allocated to them
11. 
 
Figure 5: Competitive bidding and rent derived from technological progress 




















•  Quotas and green certificates 
In the case of quotas, under the pressures of the mandated suppliers and the competitive pressures of 
the certificates market, technological progress is introduced by the RES-E producers who get 
different innovative capabilities. As in the static case, each player have indeed to fulfil their 
obligations at their own cost, and the technological rent could only be extracted by going beyond 
their quota by the exchange of certificates. In order to simplify we consider the simplest device of 
exchangeable quotas without penalty and we analyse briefly three cases:  the case the sellers of 
certificates are much more rapid to exploit knowledge progress than the other ones, the case the 
buyers of certificates use innovation to reduce their cost handicap while the former certificates sellers 
are technologically static,  and the case every producer is able to made the same technological effort 
on the leading technologies for their future units. 
                                                 









































Figure 6 .Technological  rent in the quotas/green certificates system: 



















In the first case (see Figure 6), Producer B, who is initially a seller of certificates, is much more 
dynamic in the introduction of technological progress in its new projects than Producer A, who is a 
buyer of certificates. This lowers its marginal production cost curve mcB to mc'B. This has 
paradoxical effects in the case of exchange of certificates: with the same quota q, the equilibrium 
price decreases from p to p’, Producer A (who is a buyer) has an interest in buying a larger share of 
its certificates on the market, and Producer B is encouraged to produce more certificates because of 
its lower costs in order to sell them. But he would not automatically benefit from a technological rent 
because of the certificates price decrease which limits the gains on the market. It will be beneficial 
only if the area C'B’D’ (fig 6) is higher than the area CBD in the static case (fig 3 replicated), which 
will be realised only under strict conditions on the respective slopes of the former and new marginal 
cost curves of the producers B. 
The second case is a situation in which buyers of certificates try to compensate for their initial 
capacity handicap by exploiting technical progress for installing future RES capacities, while the 
former sellers do not move its technology. We could logically guess that this would reduce the price 
and the number of certificates exchanged on the market, and thus reduce Operator B’s differential 
rent. 
In the third case the marginal cost curves of the two representative producers decrease in a very 
similar way to the static approach. By and large the exchange of certificates will be quite similar, but 
in contrast to a situation they do not make innovation. No real technological rent is added to the 
small differential rent of the static analysis (triangle BCD in figure 3). The price of certificates will 
decrease. However, there is a positive difference for the consumers in terms of the RES equilibrium 
price on the certificate market because the marginal cost curves of the two producers is lower. 
The framework of this paper does not allow this analysis to be developed further. However, this brief 
development is sufficient to argue that from a dynamic viewpoint, in the quota system the 
technological rent is either non-existent or very limited compared to the case of the feed-in tariffs. 
We are neither in a logic of virtual competition referring to an administrative price, as in the feed-in 
tariff case, nor in a logic of oligopolistic competition by innovation where temporary monopoly 
positions are searched, because of the nature of the quotas/green certificates system and the price-









































of increasing market share on the green certificate market but the incentive for the producers to 
reduce their costs in order to reach the quotas because they themselves have to finance the overcost 
of the RES-E obligation. Finally, consumers could be the winners if the competition between the 
suppliers is such that their marginal cost decrease surpasses the market retail price in the 
configuration of the total opening up of the market.  
•  Comparison of dynamic efficiency  
To conclude on the issue of stimulation of technological progress by different instruments, a delicate 
balance has to be struck between the amount of differential and technological rent to be given to the 
producers and their equipment manufacturers in order to stimulate R&D investment in risky 
technologies on one hand, and the collective cost of the incentive policy to the economy, on the other 
hand. 
With quantity-based instruments governed by market mechanisms, technological progress 
sharply reduces the rent allocated to producers and consequently the cost for the community. 
Moreover, making producers compete with one another through competitive bids forces them to 
adopt the most efficient technologies in order to be awarded contracts. However, as this involves 
restricting their profit margins by eliminating or limiting the rent derived from technological 
progress, they have difficulty in initiating the innovation process by investing in R&D. So it is with 
the quotas system to a certain extent: the logic of decentralised competition on the certificates market 
does not allow the producers/constructors to contemplate a perspective of profit by innovations. In 
both cases they are limiting their cost decrease strategies to the choice of the best available 
technologies. In this situation, public R&D is the only way to improve technology. 
 
Table 1: Comparison of total producers’ surpluses according to support instruments 
 
  Differential rent               
(static) 
Differential and technological 
rent (dynamic) 
Competitive bidding (fig 2/fig 5)  None  None 
Quotas/Green certificates (fig 3/ fig 6)  Low (CBD)  Uncertain (CBD - C’B’D’) 
Constant feed-in tariff (fig 1)  Maximum (cAp) Maximum  (cDp0) 




With feed-in tariffs, the maximum surplus is allocated to producers, so that they are better placed to 
develop new technologies. None of these extreme solutions is really satisfactory. This is especially 
true of constant feed-in tariffs, which award the benefits of technological progress only to producers. 
From this point of view, sliding rates are the most attractive options as they do not entirely eliminate 
the surplus derived from technological progress as bidding processes do, while at the same time they 
enable consumers to benefit from the improved performance levels due to technological progress 
(Table 1). 
 
5.  Comparison of European experiences: relative performances of the instruments 
As incentive programs based on these instruments in the European countries correspond to an 
experience of 10 years, an examination of the results obtained as a consequence of the incentives 
allow the analysis of the economic and social efficiency of these instruments to be complemented. It 
will now be examined in terms of cost-efficiency and in dynamic terms - technological and industrial 









































characters of the institutions and the transaction costs associated to each instrument, their observed 
performances are not only explainable by their theoretical properties.  
The impact of these instruments appears to underline the fact that feed-in tariffs are better than 
competitive bidding procedures in terms of installed capacities, industrial development and 
technological learning, but with an important cost which could be viewed as the price to be paid to 
initiate the process in the first stage of the new technological cycle. Despite its novelty the 
quotas/green certificates systems could challenge some advantages of the feed-in tariffs during the 
second stage when technological and industrial maturity gets closer. 
 
5.1. Effectiveness and cost of the instruments   
The performances in terms of stimulation of RES-E installations must be balanced with the collective 
costs of the instruments. 
•  Stimulation of RES installations 
The two first systems exhibit radically different characteristics in terms of project profitability, risks 
and transaction costs that directly affect the investment. 
If we refer to wind power as reference RES, the fixed feed-in tariffs in operation in Germany, 
Denmark and Spain have led to sustained development of wind power production: these three 
countries alone accounted for around 85% of additional installed capacity in Europe between 1998 
and 2001. Total installed wind capacity in Germany, Denmark and Spain reached 7717 MW at the 
end of 2000, while it did not exceed 760 MW in the UK, Ireland and France. 
Table 2. Comparison of installed wind power capacities in 2000 (in MW) 
Incentives Countries  Capacity 
end  1999 
Additional capacity 
in 2000 









 TOTAL  10812  3095 









 TOTAL  606  154 
  Source:  WindPower Monthly, The Windindicator (http://www.wpm.co.nz), April 2002. 
 
This result can be partly explained by the high price level proposed in the fixed feed-in tariff systems 
(7-9 c€/kWh) while the competitive bidding systems led to significantly lower prices (4-5 c€/kWh). 
All else being equal, it is perfectly logical for higher feed-in tariffs to correspond to greater quantities 
of RES. The differences between the respective prices do not however explain all the very significant 
differences between the installed capacities. The explanation also lies in institutional parameters, 
especially the very nature of each incentive device, its capacity to limit price risk, and the transaction 
cost around project definition and implementation. The more incentive nature of feed-in tariffs lies 
also partly in the fact that they are more predictable and limit transaction costs (Van Dijk et al, 2003; 
Haas, 2001). 
By comparison, the bidding system means lower expected profitability than those associated with 
fixed feed-in tariffs and higher exposure to technological and political risks. Moreover, the British 
experience [
12] revealed two other drawbacks: firstly dependence on governmental decisions to open 
auction rounds which creates uncertainty that does exist in the feed-in tariff system and in the 
                                                 









































exchangeable quotas systems; secondly even when numerous candidates have been selected, 
remaining uncertainty regarding the feasibility of projects, which is reflected by the cancellation of 
most of them.  
Firstly, indeed, the fact that bidding procedures take place at irregular and particularly unscheduled 
intervals creates a climate of instability that works to the disadvantage of operators, in contrast to 
feed-in tariff systems. Secondly, the high transaction costs incurred by the bidding procedures (for 
project formulation and monitoring), in addition to the cost of obtaining building permission, has 
undeniably been an obstacle. High transaction costs have led to larger projects, and this in return has 
meant difficulties in obtaining planning permission. Feed-in tariffs (FIT) may also appear less 
sensible to political will than bidding systems. It is noteworthy that this could play also against the 
adaptability of the instrument when the collective cost reaches the limit of social acceptance. Of 
course, FITs can be removed or the prices lowered by the regulating authority but the opportunities 
of administrative interference seem rather limited when the tariffs has been set. Comparatively, there 
are numerous possibilities in the bidding system to influence the system by modifying the selection 
criteria or the relative importance of each technology band. In other words, the balance between the 
risks involved and expected profits is thus clearly to the disadvantage of competitive bidding. 
Conversely, the quotas system is by nature more effective that the competitive bidding system to 
incite to develop RES for two reasons. It is a foreseeable mandatory system with an individual 
obligation to respect the quota under the incentive of a penalty; and the foreseeable nature of the 
quota and the penalty allows the possibility of anticipating and adapting in order to overcome project 
risks. This system is not exempt from transaction costs and market uncertainties, especially for the 
green certificates exchanges, but adaptations are observed that allow transaction costs to be 
minimised: the creation of organised market with standardized transactions, and the development of 
long-term contracts between developers and suppliers subject to the RES obligation in order to 
secure RES investment. The experience of the Texas renewable portfolio standards demonstrates that 
almost all the RES-E capacity development has occurred in this institutional framework (Langniss 
and Wiser, 2003). 
•  The collective cost of each instrument 
Efficiency in terms of installed capacities has to be balanced with the collective cost to the economy. 
The policy of guaranteed feed-in tariffs has proved very costly in terms of public subsidies. This is 
the direct result of its positive effect on RES. Subsidies paid in 1998 by the Danish government 
represented more than 100 million euros and this amount had to continue growing because of the 
regular increase in capacity, creating an ever-increasing burden on the State budget (Morthorst, 
1999) until the new government challenged it in 2002. This policy also requires costly cross-
subsidies that have been estimated at around 200 million euros in Germany in 2000. In France, two 
years after the adoption of feed-in tariffs, control of the future amount of the subsidy (financed by a 
tax on each transmitted kWh) is a motive to slow down developers by means of bureaucratic hurdles 
and envisage the adoption of a quota system in the future. 
In the case of bidding systems, the possibility of controlling quantities or the amount of public 
subsidies allocated to RES is a major advantage. In this respect, a quantity-based approach enables 
public expenditure to be controlled more efficiently by organising incremental increases, or 
conversely to slow down, progressively revealing the shape of the cost curves. A comparable result 
could have been obtained with guaranteed feed-in tariffs, but the system is rigid from the institutional 
standpoint, making it difficult to adjust guaranteed prices in accordance with technological progress 
and installed capacities. Introducing sliding rates is a real progress in this respect, with price changes 
announced from the outset. 
In the quotas/certificates system, the quantities are also directly controlled; however, the problem of 
controlling public subsidies is overcome because all expenses are directly financed by the mandated 









































stays in the definition of the national goal and the derived quotas, given the country’s endowment of 
resources and the reasonable rhythm of development of the RES capacity. It is a matter of not 
overcharging the suppliers, increasing their expenses in order to respect their RES obligation, and 
raising electricity price levels. With an established objective, however, the certificate exchange 
mechanism clearly works in the direction of the overall economic efficiency. 
The social efficiency of each instrument can be assessed at this stage by balancing their collective 
cost (so important in the case of the feed-in tariffs) with the implicit value allocated to preservation 
of collective goods (environment quality, climate stability). We have already stressed the fact that the 
damages avoided cannot be precisely and reliably assessed. The answer to this problem is the 
definition of the quantitative RES installation objective, which corresponds to a quantitative avoided 
emissions objective. Other things being equal (such as endowment in resources), each governmental 
objective could be assumed to reflect the collective preference of each country to preserve the global 
environment. 
The social efficiency of instruments cannot be assessed independently of their context of collective 
preference. In other words, the high collective cost of a support instrument that allows a large 
installed RES capacity to be promoted does not reflect a priori excessive investment by an economy. 
It should therefore be stressed that the objectives initially set by the governments that opted for 
competitive bidding systems (UK, Ireland, France) were much less ambitious at the outset than those 
of the German, Danish and Spanish governments, which chose the feed-in tariffs. The difference 
between the results obtained with competitive bidding and feed-in prices is thus due in part to the 
fact that the implicit aims in the two cases were significantly different, in particular in terms of 
policies costs. However, the European harmonisation process, marked at the present stage by the 
RES Directive, could in future unify the perception of the RES benefits and the instruments used to 
support them, especially the quotas system. 
•  5.2. Dynamic efficiency: technological and industrial impacts 
As explained before, feed-in tariffs and pay-as-bid tendering schemes differ in terms of how the 
surplus resulting from differential rent and technological innovation is shared out. In the first case, it 
is producers/investors and manufacturers who benefit from lower costs, if prices are not adjusted in 
step with technological change, while in the second case, producers pass on cost savings to taxpayers 
or consumers. Innovation incentives are thus different from one scheme to another if one considers 
the surplus increase expected from technical change. 
Innovation and adoption must be differentiated here. In the bidding system, competitive pressure has 
indisputably forced the developers/producers to cut their costs down, in order to remain competitive: 
in England and Wales, for example, since the first Order was made in 1990, the average price paid to 
projects awarded contracts has decreased from 6.5 p/kWh to 2.71 p/kWh (Haas et al., 2001).  This 
result has been obtained by seeking more favourable sites and economies of scale, organisational and 
technological learning, and the adoption of available more efficient technologies. The unfavourable 
sharing of surplus, however, does not favour investment in technological innovation programs and 
narrows the potential for emergence of new RES equipment manufacturers. 
Available empirical data are insufficient for performing a detailed analysis of surplus-sharing 
between producers and consumers and its consequences in terms of industrial development and 
technological progress. However, an examination of the incentive systems implemented in the 
various European countries confirms the results obtained by our analysis. 
On the industrial level, the impact differs between countries that have set up guaranteed tariffs and 
those that use competitive bidding schemes. In 2000-2002, Germany, Denmark and Spain were home 
to eight of the ten biggest wind turbine manufacturers in the world (Table 3). On the other hand, in 
the United Kingdom, the government has not reached its goal of developing a competitive renewable 









































inexperienced British manufacturers to the advantage of Danish manufacturers who, better prepared 
by a much larger national market, have supplied Britain with most of its wind energy generating 
equipment. 
Table 3: Top ten manufacturers in 2001 
 





Vestas DK 1630 23
Enercon D 989 14
Neg Micon DK 875 13
Enron Wind USA 861 12
Gamesa SP 649 9
Bonus DK 593 9
Nordex D 461 7
Made SP 191 3
Mitsubishi JP 178 3
Repower D 133 2  
Source : Observ'ER, 2003 
  
The constitution of a competitive industry parallel to the innovative process can be viewed as the 
justification of the important cost of the feed-in tariff system, much larger than with the quantity-
driven approaches. It also has had a clear positive effect in terms of innovation and investment cost 
decrease in Denmark and Germany (IEA, 2000). The wider diffusion observed, and the more 
favourable sharing of surpluses, has been profitable to RES producers and constructors who have had 
time to consolidate their industrial basis and invest in R&D programs. Conversely, the experience 
with the bidding system in the United Kingdom shows that the reduced margins inherent in the 
system limit the budgets of developers and manufacturers. It has encouraged producers to adopt 
foreign best-available technologies in order to remain competitive, but it has not enabled them to 
present well-structured industrial supplies or invest major resources in R&D. Consequently, in 
interdependent economies operating different support mechanisms, the reduction in observed costs 
for wind generating systems with bidding systems is supported by the technical progress made by 
manufacturers in countries where support policies are deliberately favourable. In these countries, 
since firms are allowed to benefit from the differential rent, feed-in tariffs make it possible for 
manufacturers to invest more heavily in R&D and consolidate their industrial base. 
The adoption of the quota system could re-shuffle the cards. However, on the basis of the preceding 
analysis, the limitation of differential rent and technological rent for manufacturers and RES 
producers, and the need for the mandated suppliers to limit the cost of their obligation, do not create 
a favourable context for a RD effort. Fortunately, this device is being adopted in Europe at a time 
when some national RES equipment industries have had time to reach the stage of maturity by 
consolidation allowed by the feed-in tariffs systems; but it appears probable that the quotas system 
will not promote home technological effort or national industry. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The theoretical discussion of the search for a more economically and socially efficient support 
system and a fairer distribution of the surplus resulting from public incentive policies between 
producers and the community reflects the public authorities’ anxiety for supporting the development 









































Comparing the efficiency of price-based and quantity-based systems is thus a way of helping to 
improve the manner in which they are supported rather than one of backing the partisans of one 
system or the other. 
In terms of installed capacity, much better results have been obtained with price-based approaches 
than with the quantity-based approaches that have been used until recently. In theory, this difference 
should not exist, as bidding prices set at the same level as feed-in tariffs should logically lead to 
comparable installed capacities. The difference can be explained by the higher feed-in tariffs and the 
stronger incentive effect of guaranteed prices, which makes this incentive system more stable and 
more predictable in the eyes of investors. On the other hand, quantity-based approaches are more 
efficient as bidding for defining and adjusting the overall goals and adjusting the quotas provides an 
indirect way of controlling overall costs. 
 
Table 3. Comparative advantages of the different instruments 
 








innovate (RD, etc) 
Feed-in tariffs  Effective  No  High  Effective 
Bidding Weak  (political 
influence) 
Partial (auctions) Controlled  Weak, but adoption 
of foreign BAT* 
Quotas/certificates Effective  (quotas) Yes  Controlled  Not  yet,  but 
adoption of foreign 
BAT* 
*BAT: business as usual technology 
Fixed-price and pay-as-bid systems lead to two situations that differ in the way in which the 
differential rent is distributed. In the case of fixed feed-in tariffs it is the producers who benefit 
entirely, whereas in the auction/pay-as-bid system and the quota/certificate system, very little or no 
rent is given to them. Similarly, the surplus resulting from technological progress is distributed solely 
to the benefit of producers in the case of fixed price systems and solely to the benefit of consumers in 
the auction/pay-as-bid system and quotas system. Consequently, they have different impacts on the 
possibility of developing a national RES manufacturing industry and benefiting from the learning. 
European experience in supporting wind energy shows that in the first case, conditions are more 
favourable for the development of new technologies but at a high cost to the community, whereas in 
the second case the lower margins for producers raise questions concerning ongoing technological 
progress. Between these two extremes, sliding feed-in tariffs that make allowance for improved 
performance levels are incentive systems that distribute surplus more fairly between producers and 
consumers and are thus of obvious interest in supporting the development of new energy 
technologies without the entire cost burden falling on the consumer. 
The potential advantages offered by green certificate trading systems based on fixed quotas are 
encouraging a number of countries to introduce them in order to achieve high installation targets in 
an economically efficient way. Greater control over quantities, competition among producers and the 
incentive to lower costs are among the main reasons for adopting green certificates. This system also 
has an advantage over the others in terms of efficiency of allocation. This advantage, which is based 
on the exploitation of differences in marginal costs, can be usefully applied at European level to 
reach the targets fixed by the European Directive at the lowest cost to the community (REBUS, 









































certificates markets and the creation of a framework that investors consider stable, its actual 
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